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The public debate over Target2 balances suffers from
numerous misunderstandings and wrong conclusions.
Because the Target2 balances are seen as the core of
a problem and not as an accidental symptom, it
obstructs the view of the true challenges for mone-
tary and fiscal policy in order to solve the financial
and debt crises. This realisation is the prerequisite,
however, for setting the debate on the Target2 bal-
ances right again. 
Target21 is a platform for the payments system that is
jointly run by the central banks of the Eurosystem.
Payments in central bank money are settled ultimate-
ly and in real time. They are primarily payments
between banks, payments between banks and ancil-
lary systems (e.g. security settlement systems, mass
payments systems) as well as payments as part of
open market operations of the Eurosystem. Overall
(as of 15 July 2011) 190 entities are participating via
the Bundesbank in Target2.2 These direct participants
include, in addition to German banks, German sub-
sidiaries of foreign banks as well as some third coun-
try banks whose national central banks are not them-
selves participating in Target2. In 2010 about 45 mil-
lion transactions with a total value of around 214 tril-
lion euros were processed by the German Target2
component. Thus, Target2-Bundesbank is the biggest
component of the common platform in terms of units
(about half of all transactions) as in terms of volume
(with a share of more than a third). About one quar-
ter of all transfers were cross-border in 2010.
The so-called Target2 balances of the national central
banks reflect cross-border transactions. On the one
hand they are based on transactions of the banks in
the money and capital market. On the other hand
they may be traced to transfers of the non-bank sec-
tor that are carried out by banks. A positive balance
at a national central bank means the inflow of central
bank money to the respective banking system, where-
as a negative balance correspondingly implies an out-
flow. This can occur when a country’s banking system
obtains more refinancing at its central bank than cor-
responds to its calculated liquidity needs (for example
for meeting its reserve requirement and for cash). This
is the case, for example, if a cross-border payment of
a merchandise shipment is not offset by a return flow
of capital from abroad.3 The settlement balances
against the European Central Bank (ECB), which
functions as the central counterparty, generated in the
course of the day by cross-border transactions
between the participating national central banks are
netted at the end of each business day. The Target2
claims balance against the ECB, accumulated by the
Bundesbank before 31 July 2011, amounted to rough-
ly 343 billion euros.4
Target2 payments are made in central bank money. An
additional procurement of liquidity via Target2 is not
possible. In the Eurosystem, central bank money is pri-
marily provided by monetary refinancing operations
that are subject to uniform rules in every country. Risks
from these operations are principally distributed
among the national central banks according to their
respective share in the capital of the ECB, regardless of
which national central bank has conducted a monetary
refinancing operation. To this extent, the Target2 bal-
ances of a national central bank are not an appropriate
indicator of its actual risk position resulting from the
supply of central bank money. For the Bundesbank a
positive Target2 balance represents no other risk than a * Deutsche Bundesbank. This contribution reflects the personal
opinion of the authors. It does not necessarily correspond to the
views of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
1 Target2 stands for Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross
Settlement Express Transfer System 2.
2 A total of about 4,500 institutes participate directly or indirectly in
Target2. If branches and subsidiaries of the direct and indirect par-
ticipants as well as correspondent banks are included, around
60,000 banks worldwide may be reached via Target2 (European
Central Bank 2011).
3 A detailed presentation of the process with the help of stylised
accounts and a discussion of possible causes for the generation of set-
tlement balances in Target2 is given by Bindseil and König (2011).
4 On the development of the Target2 balance, see Deutsche
Bundesbank (2011).positive Target2 balance of the Banque de France.
Target2 balances depend largely on the distribution of
the bank-treasury activities in the euro area. Thus, a
foreign bank could get the needed central bank credit
also via its legally independent subsidiary or a branch
in Germany that then passes these funds to the parent
office  via Target2. This transaction would ceteris
paribus lower the Target2 balance of the Bundesbank.
The risk borne jointly by the Eurosystem would remain
unchanged compared to a direct refinancing at with the
central bank of the parent institution. This also
becomes clear from another vantage point: if the pro-
vision of central bank money in the Eurosystem were
done centrally by the ECB, there would in principle be
no national Target2 balances. Countries/regions of the
monetary union with deficits in their payment transac-
tion would increasingly take up refinancing credits at
the ECB; other countries/regions would take up less. In
the final analysis, Target2 claims against the ECB are
generated because of the decentralised construction of
the Eurosystem; the absolute size is limited by the total
amount of the central bank money supplied. 
It is wrong, therefore, to assume that original risks of
the national central banks in the Eurosystem result
from Target2 balances. It is, however, correct that the
development of the Target2 balances since the start of
the financial crisis in mid-2007 has revealed problems
in the European banking and financial system. In the
crisis, the Eurosystem consciously assumed a larger
intermediation function in view of the massive dis-
ruptions in the interbank market by extending its liq-
uidity control instruments. With this greater role in
the provision of central bank money – essentially by
changing to a full allotment procedure in refinancing
operations and the extension of longer-term refinanc-
ing operations – the total volume of refinancing cred-
its provided has increased (temporarily even marked-
ly). At the same time, the quality requirements for the
underlying collateral were reduced in the crisis. The
higher risk was accepted in order to maintain the
functioning of the financial system under more diffi-
cult conditions. 
The need for additional liquidity has occurred espe-
cially in the periphery countries, whose banks in order
to refinance have been relying to an ever increasing
extent on the central banks there, as they can obtain
no or hardly any funds in the capital market. Thus,
banks from the countries most affected by the sover-
eign debt crisis (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) now
account for about half of the entire refinancing vol-
ume of the Eurosystem. Shifts in regional demand for
central bank liquidity have significantly contributed
to the generation of Target2 balances. In the course of
this development, the overall risk of the monetary
refinancing operations has risen markedly for the
Eurosystem. To a certain extent this was the unavoid-
able consequence of responding to the crisis. The gen-
erally accepted role of the central banks as lender of
last resort for the banking system must remain tem-
porary, however. In a monetary union, the risks can
be distributed widely to the taxpayers of the member
countries via the balance sheet of the central bank.
Since it cannot be the responsibility of an indepen-
dent monetary policy to redistribute the solvency
risks of banking systems or even countries to the tax-
payers of the monetary union, high demands are
placed, as a matter of principle, on the collateral.
Banks that are cut off permanently from the capital
market and are therefore potentially confronted by
solvency rather than liquidity problems should not be
financed primarily via central bank credit in the medi-
um to long term. Such risk assumptions and decisions
on their distribution are the responsibility of the
democratically legitimised political institutions. The
central banks should thus keep extraordinary crisis
measures within strict bounds and then quickly
reduce them. This applies regardless of the develop-
ment of Target2 balances. 
The public discussion has identified other problems
associated with the rising Target2 balances. It is
feared, for example, that the shift in the refinancing
behaviour has crowded out investment in Germany.
German banks have indeed reduced Eurosystem refi-
nancing, as funds flowed in from abroad and because
they were able to obtain liquidity at favourable terms
in the interbank market. Consequently, the share of
German banks involved in the refinancing operations
of the Eurosystem, which amounted to about 250 bil-
lion euros in early 2007 – more than half of the total
volume – most recently declined to about one tenth.
However, this decline of the refinancing volume was
– no least due to the full allotment policy of the
Eurosystem – a voluntary decision of the German
banks. As a consequence of the liquidity inflow from
abroad, the German banks – given corresponding
demand – were able to do more lending. This mecha-
nism has thus not led to a crowding out of domestic
investment. A possible ‘resource competition’ does
not exist either in real economic terms or with respect
to the central banks. As long as banks in the core
countries have central-bank eligible collateral, their
refinancing possibilities via the central bank are not
constrained. 
CESifo Forum 2012 74
Special IssueCESifo Forum 2012 75
Special Issue
Furthermore, some argue that a continuation of
recent developments would inhibit monetary policy,
as the surplus liquidity at individual banks in core
countries, especially in Germany, would impair the
Eurosystem’s interest-rate control. These fears are not
convincing. If liquidity is plentiful, the deposit facili-
ty puts a floor on the lending interest rates of the
commercial banks. For the commercial banks the
interest rate of the deposit facility constitutes oppor-
tunity costs for any other form of deposit and lend-
ing. If the key interest rate is raised – as a rule the
interest rates of the deposit facility are raised by the
same amount – the opportunity costs of the commer-
cial banks also rise. Consequently, a plentiful supply
of liquidity cannot in itself disrupt monetary policy
transmission. The empirical finding concerning the
interest rate pass-through, also in a crisis, confirms
that in this respect there has not been a structural
change in the euro area. Beyond this, the Eurosystem
can withdraw liquidity from the market at any time by
absorbing operations (e.g. repurchase operations) if
the abundant surplus liquidity of the commercial
banks in the core countries is likely to jeopardise price
stability. Reliance on gold and foreign exchange
reserves considered necessary by some critics of
Target2 balances (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011) is
not necessary. Decisive for the monetary policy of the
Eurosystem are basically not the Target2 balances but
the total supply of liquidity – no matter which nation-
al central bank is the primary provider. A differentia-
tion between central bank money that is created by a
central bank of the Eurosystem in refinancing opera-
tions with domestic banks and that which is supplied
in other countries and flows to the banks via Target2
is irrelevant in a monetary union. A euro is a euro,
independent of which of the national central banks
puts it into circulation. 
Finally, there is the argument that the current account
deficits of the peripheral countries were and are
financed by Target2 balances. In fact, the relationship,
purely based on the mechanism of net balances
between the current account balances on the one hand
and Target2 positions on the other, which has been
observed lately, may have led to the conclusion that by
accepting Target2 balances the Eurosystem made cur-
rent account disequilibria all too easy. This accusation
is not justified, however. It is true that in a monetary
union diverging current account balances may be gen-
erated and that these were generated after the estab-
lishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU).
In a common financial market with a common curren-
cy they can be financed more easily via private capital
movements. In this respect, a monetary union may
also facilitate the maintenance of such disequilibria if
no adequate pricing of risks takes place with the pro-
vision of capital and credit. A direct financing of cur-
rent account deficits by the central banks has not
occurred and will not take place in the future. This is
also shown by Bindseil and König (2011) as well as
Buiter et al. (2011), by comparing current account bal-
ances and changes in Target2 positions of individual
countries over time. The example of Ireland, whose
current account turned from a large deficit into a sur-
plus, also confirms that this need not be accompanied
by a corresponding reduction of Target2 balances; the
Irish negative balances even rose sharply during this
period. This makes clear that the problems with the
Target2 balances lie primarily in the banking systems
of the peripheral countries of the EMU. It is the volu-
minous supply of liquidity by the Eurosystem that
supports the banking systems with limited access to
market financing. This prevents extremely short-term
adjustment processes, not least also of current account
deficits, and instead allows for a somewhat extended
but orderly process of the necessary adjustments in the
peripheral countries. Such a gradual adjustment with-
out serious distortions in the financial systems of these
and potentially also other countries can keep the total
economic costs markedly lower. This does not mean,
however, that the correction of the disequilibria can be
avoided or should be postponed. 
A more accurate look at the relationships and back-
grounds of the Target2 balances has thus shown that
the idea of a direct limitation or the demand for a reg-
ular settlement of the Target2 balances is not appro-
priate. This applies also to proposals for Europe to
adopt the annual settlement of the Interdistrict
Settlement Accounts (ISA) of the US Federal Reserve
System (see Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 2010). They fail to recognise the form
and purpose of the US settlement system: the settle-
ment that is practiced – as a rule only partly – in the
Fed system is done with securities received by the
regional Federal Reserve banks from open market
operations of the system. A limitation of the balances
or a constraint of payment transactions among the
districts has never been intended. The mechanism is
not capable of eliminating disequilibria among the
districts or preventing them permanently. It only
serves to exchange non-interest bearing ISA balances
into interest-bearing positions. In contrast, the
Target2 balances in the Eurosystem a priori bear
interest at the marginal allotment rate for main refi-
nancing operations, due to the present full allotmentcurrently at the minimum bid rate. This is based on
the view that such assets in the central bank balance
sheet should in principle bear appropriate interest
rates. As the interest rates on Target2 settlement bal-
ances enter the profit distribution of the Eurosystem
in the end, no additional interest income is generated
for the participating national central banks. 
A decline of Target2 balances is expected as soon as
foreign banks no longer seek or are able to procure
excessive liquidity from the Eurosystem and the liq-
uidity then is indirectly distributed throughout the sys-
tem. This should happen as soon as the tensions abate
in the financial markets and not least the euro-inter-
bank money market has regained its full functionality
so that the liquidity balancing among commercial
banks (also international) will function once again.
This would require that the confidence in the banking
sector in the euro area and in the individual banks is
restored and the problem banks are rehabilitated or
exit the market. For the Eurosystem it is decisive in this
context that the corresponding responsibilities
between monetary policy and fiscal policy are pre-
served. In concrete terms this means that the short-
term special liquidity measures of the Eurosystem
aimed at containing the acute crisis-like developments
must not delay the necessary restructuring process or
even replace it. For this reason alone a timely reduc-
tion of the special measures is a must. 
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